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ABSTRACT
Conflict and security scholars have identified ethnic and religious conflicts as one of the main
causes of insecurity in Nigeria the African most populous country. One of the states in which these
twin conflicts have been occurring is Kano state that incidentally is also the most populous state in
the country. Hausa/Fulani ethnic group whose religion is Islam dominates the state that has a
current estimated population of over ten million. However, owing to its background as the
commercial nerve centre of the northern region, the state has attracted substantially Christian
immigrants from the southern parts of the country. Unfortunately, the relationship between the host
Muslim Hausa/Fulani and their Christian immigrants especially the Igbos over the years have been
characterized by series of conflicts arising from ethnic and religious acrimonies. Against this
backdrop, this paper examines the role of Kano Emirate Council in the management of these
conflicts. The study is based on a qualitative research method with secondary data obtained through
review of related published materials. Finding of the study revealed that, Kano Emirate Council
plays significant role in managing ethnic and religious conflicts in the state on informal basis. On
the backdrop of this finding, this paper concludes that management of Kano state security which is
often threatened by ethno-religious conflicts can be improved with the reintegration of the Emirate
Council into the security management framework.
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INTRODUCTION
According to conflict and security scholars, ethnic and religious conflict is one of the main causes
of insecurity challenges in Nigeria. This is because major political and economic issues in the
country are usually contested along the ethnic and religious divides. To this extent, most Nigerians
appear to prefer identifying their selves by their ethnic or religious affiliations and to some extent
along regionalism instead of seeing themselves as Nigerians (Smyth and Robinson 2001). Nigeria
with a current population estimated to be close to 200 million is a multi-ethnic and religious country.
Although, the country has over 300 different ethnic groupings, the dominant ones are the
Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. Majority of the ethnic groups that constitute the population of the
country are Muslims and Christians while the rest belong to traditional and other forms of religion.
However, in most cases, prominent conflicts occurring in the country has often been between the
dominant three ethnic groups or between the Muslims and the Christians. Although Kano is a
predominant Hausa/Fulani and by implication Muslim state, it has a substantial Christian
immigrants from the southern parts of the country majority of them being the Igbos and Yorubas
who are engaged in different commercial activities.
Over the years, the state since its creation in 1967 has witnessed several incidents of
conflicts between the dominant Muslim Hausa/ Fulani and minority Christians from the southern
parts of the country over business transactions or social interactions. In addition, there have also
been conflicts in respond to attacks on Muslims in other parts of the country. Conversely, Kano
state is been described as a home of ethnic and religious reprisal attacks. Under the current
constitution, responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the state lays with the government
security institutions. However, despite this constitutional provision, relevant literatures indicate that
Kano Emirate Council which until 1968 used to be part of the security management has been
assisting in the management of these conflicts on informal. Against this backdrop, this article
examines the role of Kano Emirate Council and the strategies it employed in managing such
conflicts. The article being an ex post facto expository research on the role of the Emirate Council
in conflict management relied on secondary data obtained from review of related published
materials.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KANO EMIRATE CONCIL
Kano Emirate Council is situated in the ancient city of Kano which is the capital of Kano state in
northwest region of Nigeria. Created in 1967, Kano state which has a population of 9.4 million
based on the 2006 National Population Commission (NPC) census result is Nigeria’s most populous
state. The state which has a total of 44 local government area councils with an area of 20,479.6
square kilometer is also regarded as the biggest commercial centre of the whole northern states
(NEITI 2013). Although, English is the official language of conducting government business, the
majority of Kano people speak Hausa language as such commercial activities are conducted in
Hausa. In addition to English and Hausa languages, Arabic is also spoken in the state as most of the
citizens are familiar with Arabic literature due to the influence of Islam. The state also shares
borders with Katsina, Jigawa, Bauchi and Kaduna states respectively (KSMH 2009). The location
of the emirate which is the city is popularly known as the (birni)1 and populated solely by the
aboriginal Hausa Muslims while the outside walls also referred to as (waje)2 are inhabited by other
ethnic and religious communities. Although Kano is generally considered as a strong hold of Hausa
Muslims, it still has all the attributes of a diverse city harbouring Christians and Muslims of
different ethnic groups.
Moreover, Kano city pride itself on its historical background of providing hospitality to
economic migrants (Wakili 1997). Although the emirate council is located in Municpal local
government area council, five other local government areas including Gwale, Fagge, Dala,
Nassarawa, and Tarauni where the government house is situated surround it.
1Hausa words for city
2 Hausa term for outskirt of the city.
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Figure 1.1: The Map of Kano State and its 44 Local Governments
Source: Mnch2 (2016)
Kano Emirate Council also known as Ma Sauratar Kano3 has a history that is said to be spanning
more than a millennium. This despite the fact that the larger part of the Emirate’s history prior to the
sixth century was built on myths ( Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966). The Emir’s palace which is the
official seat of the emirate council and also known as Gidan Rumfa is one of the most enduring
legacies in the history of Kano kinship (Tanko 2014).
3Hausa term for Kano Emirate Council
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Figure 1.2: Main Entrance to Kano Emirate Council
Source: Poi.Api.Hotels (2016)
The current structure of the emirate council according to Blench et al (2006) was established
after the defeat of the Hausa ruling dynasty by Sheikh Usman Danfodio between the periods of
1805-1807. The Fulani Jihadists ruled Kano until 1903 when it was also defeated by the British
colonialists in 1903. However, before the events of 1805-1807, and 1903, Muhammad Rumfa who
ruled the Kingdom between the periods of 1463-1499 under the Hausa ruling dynasty, acting on the
advice of a Middle East scholar, Shehu Maghili made attempts to change the administrative pattern
of the Kingdom by introducing Islamic constitution in fifteenth century. It is also reported that, the
Fulani Jihadists adopted the same constitution that was introduced by King Muhammad Rumfa to
consolidate their leadership in the newly established emirate council. Specifically, the Fulani
Jihadists re-organized structure of the newly established Emirate Council into districts, villages, and
wards with the Emir as the overall head. Each district was headed by an official known as Hakimi4,
4 District Head
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while each village and ward were headed by officials designated as Dagaci5 and Mai Unguwa6
respectively as shown in figure 1.3 below.
Figure 1.3: Administrative Management Structure of Kano Emirate Council
Source: Author’s PhD Fieldwork (2014)
Although Kano Emirate Council like other traditional institutions in Nigeria has witnessed series
of political changes over the years, the above administrative structure of the emirate has resisted
these changes and therefore remained the same.
HISTORY OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KANO STATE
The concept of ethnicity according to De Vos in Brass (1991:18) refers to a sense of tribal identity
which is marked by “subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people …of any aspect
of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from the other groups”. Therefore, its main features
are race, language, religion, and colour. However, the moment these “markers ceased to be a mere
means of social distinctions, and become the process of power, ethnic distinctions are transformed
into ethnicity” (Kom 2012:56). Unfortunately, in Nigeria, the concepts of ethnic and religious
5 Village Head
6 Ward Head
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identities are simultaneously used not just to distinguish between the over 300 different ethnic
groups and their belief system, but as a means of determining who gets what in the realm of politics
and distribution of privileges. Thus, the country its independence in 1960 has been characterized by
persistent ethnic and religious conflicts. Ethnic and religious conflicts also known as ethno-religious
conflicts refers to a situation in which inter-ethnic or religious relationship in a society that has
different ethnic groups with different religious affiliations is characterized by animosity, distrust,
and to some extent violent clash between one other.
In Kano state especially within the urban city there have been several ethnic conflicts
between the dominant Kanawa7 and other southern Nigerians majority of them being Igbo and the
Yoruba ethnic groups. Osaghae et al. (1994) explained that the genesis of animosity between the
Kanawa and their southern settlers can be understood from the context of divide and rule policies of
the British colonialists. One of them being the segregation policy which led to the establishment of
a separate settlement called Sabon Gari 8for the Christian southerners in Kano while the Kanawa
were kept inside the Ganuwa or Birni9 in 1911. From that time to date, the sub-urban Sabon Gari
area of Kano has come to be known as a territory for the non-Muslims especially the Igbos of
Southeastern Nigerian. This policy explains Albert (1994) was due to the fear that the contact
between the two groups might lead to revolt against the British rule. Therefore, scholars such as
Osaghae et al. (1994) contend that the policy formed the basis for the contemporary hostility
between the Kanawa and the Southerners where the former sees the later as Kafirai or Arna10.
Thus, in 1953 the first clash occurred between the two groups as a result of bitter pre-
independence political bickering between the northern and southern politicians over the issue of
appropriate date for Nigeria’s independence at the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos. This
happened when Action Group (AG) one of the Southern dominated political parties which had
opposed the unanimous position of the northern politicians on a delayed independence date came to
Kano to campaign for independence in March 1953. Although, the Northern Peoples’ Congress
7 Indigenous Kano people
8New Settlement
9 OldWalled City
10 Infidels or non-Muslims in Hausa
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(NPC) led Native Administration had organized a peaceful protest against the AG’s campaign, the
youths turned the event into a violent confrontation between the southern immigrants in Sabon Gari
area (Osaghae et al. 1994). This was followed by another ethnic violence of 1966 over a coup d’état
led by Major Nzeogu a southeastern Christian of Igbo ethnic group. Although the coup was not
successful, prominent northern leaders including the Prime Minister and Premier of the northern
region were killed. As a result of this reason, Major General Agui Ironsi who happened to be from
the same Igbo ethnic grouping like Major Nzeogu succeeded Sir Balewa as head of state. Thus, the
coup d’état was viewed by the northerners as an Igbo agenda against the northern interest.
Therefore, on 29th May 1966 a violent ethnic conflict broke out in Kano against the regime of
General Ironsi targeting the Igbo ethnic group in Sabon Gari and other places. Since then, the two
ethnic groups have been having one clash or the other at any slight provocation (Paden 1973;
Tamuno and Ukpabi 1989; Osaghae et al. 1994).
Similarly, apart from the Boko Haram religious insurgency, Kano state has also
witnessed many cases of religious conflict since its creation in 1967. Relevant literature shows
that between the periods of 1980 to date, the state has been engulfed in religious violence on at
least seven different occasions. These include the violent intra religious uprising orchestrated by
one Muhammadu Marwa (Maitatsine)11 in 1980 which later extended to Kaduna, Maiduguri,
Gombe, and Yola. The leader of Maitatsine Sect was also an immigrant from the neighbouring
Cameroonian Republic who later became fully integrated in Kano due to his scholarly
background in Islamic knowledge. Unfortunately, Malam Maitatsine as he came to be known
due to his mode of preaching by cursing anyone who disagree with him, engaged in rituals that
were considered as un-Islamic. The worst part is that he declared himself a prophet which was
rejected by the majority of Kano Muslims. This led to the conflict between the people of Kano
and his Sects. Although, the Maitatsine conflict started as an intra-Islamic issue, it latter
degenerated into a violent religious conflict that affected everybody (Osaghae et al. 1994).
This was followed by the 1982 riots between the Muslim and the Christians over a
dispute on the planned reconstruction of a church that was close to a mosque in Fagge (Ekoko
11 Someone who place Curses on others
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and Amali 1989; Albert 1994). Nine years later, another Muslim versus the Christians conflict
erupted again in the state over the planned visit of a German evangelist, Reinhard Bonnke for a
crusade (Okeke 1992). In addition, there were also religious conflicts among the followers of the
two prominent religions in the state between the year 2001, 2004, and 2008 as a response to
attacks on Muslims by the Christians in Plateau state (Minchakpu 2001; Harischfeger 2008;
Aminu 2008; Adam 2010). The most recent religious conflict in the state is that of Bichi town
over a disagreement on a shirt worn by a Christian youth with an inscription that was considered
blasphemous to by the Muslims because it insulted the personality of Prophet Muhammad (pbu).
As a result of the confrontation that ensued, the Christian youth who is from Igbo ethnic group
was mobbed to death leading to a violent conflict between the Muslims and the Christians in the
town (Premium Times, November 22, 2012).
THE ROLE OF KANO EMIRATE COUNCIL
Existing literature indicate that Kano Emirate Council has played a dominant role in the
management of all the above discussed ethnic and religious conflicts that have occurred in Kano
state. Beginning from the pre-independence violent ethnic conflict of 1953, the emirate under the
then leadership of late Abdullahi Bayero was instrumental in resolving the conflict in the state
and to some extent other parts of northern region. In Kano Sabon Gari, where the conflict
occurred, the emirate apart from issuing directives to stop the violence also dispatched its Yan
Gadi12 to assist the Nigeria Police Force in restoring normalcy in the area (Chiranchi 2007). In
the same vein, Muffet (1982) explained that Emir Ado Bayero after a meeting with the Military
Governor of the former Northern Provinces, Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina in Kaduna on the anti-Ironsi
violence of 1966 came back to Kano and issued a statement urging his subjects to halt the attacks
on southern immigrants in his domain. As a result of this intervention by the emir, further violent
attacks against the southerners in Kano were immediately halted.
12Watchmen
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Similarly, the emirate has also being playing an important role in the management of
religious conflicts in the state. For instance, during the Maitatsine violence, apart from late Emir
Ado Bayero serving as a member of the Federal Government Committee, the late Emir of Sir
Muhammadu Sanusi played a significant role in the deportation of Malam Maitatsine to his
country of origin Cameroun in the 1960s (Whitaker Jr. 1970; Tamuno 1991). The emir like his
predecessor Sir Sanusi refuted the unorthodox interpretations of the Qur’an by Malam Maitatsine
which among others forbade Muslims from using anything modern such as wrist watch, cars,
bicycles, motorbikes etc (FGN Report 1981). Also, during 2001 religious conflicts that erupted
in the state in connection with the Muslims and Christians conflict in Plateau state, the emirate
equally refuted the reasons advanced for the reprisal attacks on Christians. The emir condemned
the wrong interpretations of the events in Plateau state along the religious perspective in strong
terms and urged the people of Kano to stop further violence against the non-Muslims living in
the state (Yakubu 2005).
Again, in April 2004, the Emir of Kano made concerted efforts to stop the killing of
Christians and the looting of Igbo businesses and others following another conflict in reaction to
the killings of Muslims by Christians in Yelwa-Shendam of Plateau State. Thus, in their study
report on “the role of traditional rulers in conflict prevention and mediation in Nigeria”, Blench
et al (2006) affirmed the role played by the late Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero in resolving
the 2004 conflicts between the southerners living in Kano. In addition, the late Emir Alhaji Ado
Bayero played a significant role in halting the spread of Boko Haram in the state. Immediately,
after the 2012 Boko Haram attacks in Kano city, the emir according to Aliyu et al (2015) took a
drastic measure against the insurgents. Specifically, he was said to have instructed:
“All the ward heads across the state to ensure that, identities of new comers into their
communities are properly ascertained before they are allowed to settle. In this regards, all
local and registered property agents as well as individuals were directed to scrutinize the
identities of immigrants especially refuges from the neighboring states before
accommodating them” (Aliyu et al 2015:134).
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Apart from helping in managing full blown ethno-religious conflicts, the Emirate Council
has equally assisted in nipping some intra and inter-ethnic or religious disputes with that can lead
to serious violent conflict in the bud. One of them is the recent issue of a southern Christian
teenage girl Ese Rita Oruru, alleged to have been abducted in 2015 at Opolo, Yenagoa Local
Government Area of Bayelsa by Yunusa (Yellow) a young Kano Muslim boy from Kura local
government. A statement from the Emirate Council revealed that when the present Emir,
Muhammadu Sanusi II, was first informed of the development in September 2015, he
immediately directed the district head of Kura, Hisbah and Shariah Commissions to liaise with
the police authority and repatriate the girl back to her parent because she was still a teenager.
Therefore, in accordance with the emir’s directive, the girl was handed to the police for further
investigation and necessary action. Unfortunately, the police authority under the Zonal
Command of an Assistant Inspector General (AIG) did not act accordingly. Therefore, the girl
was kept in Kano for six months without the knowledge of the emir and against his directive
until when the matter became a serious religious problem following the sensational and
sectionalized coverage by the media. In order to avert the potential conflict between the Muslims
and the Christians, the emir immediately instructed for the girl to be brought to his palace and
she was handed to the police authority publicly for onward reunion with her parents (The
Vanguard, February 29, 2016).
Strategies Employed by the Emirate Council
Relevant literature indicates that the Emirate Council employs both formal and informal
strategies in managing the persistent ethnic and religious conflicts in Kano state. The
informal strategy which is considered as the most visible and reliable means of handling
the complex ethno-religious conflicts entails the use of its grassroots administrative
structures. On the other hand, the formal strategy which is mostly used in certain
instances revolves around the involvement of modern security agencies especially the
police. With regards to the informal strategy, the Emirate has established three Non-
indigenous Community Traditional Leadership Structures (NCTLS) in Sabon Gari for
managing conflicts between the Muslims and Christians on informal basis. These include, Non-
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indigenous Traditional Leaders (NTL); Leaders of the Ethnic Associations (LEA); and the Non-
indigene Leadership Association (NLA) which is an umbrella for leaders of all individual ethnic
associations. The leaders of these non-aboriginal ethnic groups in the likes of Eze Igbo13 and the
Oba Yoruba14 occupy positions that are created by the emirate similar to the centralized
structure of the entire emirate system.
Thus while the Ezes and the Obas as non-indigenous traditional leaders are responsible
for everything relating to their cultural traditions, partial executive mandate to administer the
affairs of the communities is given to the respective ethnic associations. The internal functions
of non-aboriginal traditional leadership is similar to what is obtained in the Emirate council
particularly in terms of prominent ceremonies, rituals, managing ethno-religious tensions and
resolving disputes through informal methods. For example, disputes among the same ethnic
group are settled by the respective ethnic association. While those that involves inter-ethnic
groups are either handled by the NLA especially if all the parties are non-aboriginals or in
conjunction with Fagge district head if an aboriginal is involved. Although, each of the ethnic
group in Sabon Gari has its traditional ruler and association, those of Yoruba and Igbo are the
most prominent owing to their population. Therefore, both the non-aboriginal traditional rulers
and ethnic associations play important roles in helping the Emirate Council to manage conflicts
within their settlements (Ehrhardt 2007).
Like their traditional rulers counterparts, the elders represent defined territorial communities.
In addition, like ethnic leaders, they also represent the interest of their people whenever they have
problems with others, and manage contentious issues within the community. For example,
depending on the nature of the problem, the issue of representing their members can be at the ward
level before the Ward head or at the local government authority. On the other hand, the internal
conflict management is usually conducted through the process of listening and negotiations on
informal basis. After which an amicable mediation or settlement is reached among the parties in
conflict. However, if this method proves abortive, the problem or dispute is referred to the ward
13 King of Igbo ethnic group
14 King of Yoruba ethnic group
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head. Despite the similarities in the roles of ethnic and community leaders, when it comes to the
aspect of authority, they are significantly differentiated. For example, ethnic group leaders such as
Oba Yoruba and Eze Igbo are usually selected based on of their appropriateness as traditional ruler.
Like in the case of Eze Igbo, the selection is based on age, respectability, income, personal authority
and knowledge of cultural traditions. But as for the leaders of ethnic associations, their selection is
made through democratic process as such their legitimacy is further strengthened by the public
support (Paden 2005).
As for the community leaders, who are not democratic representatives of any ethnic group,
their authority is determined by age, social accomplishments, knowledge which makes them to be
considered as wise men. Their authority and respect within the community are due to their age
knowledge, and experience to address communal and religious conflicts. In addition to the non-
indigenous ethnic leadership and associations, the Emirate also uses religious and native community
elders. These religious leaders are drawn from both Muslims and Christians religious organizations
such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam (JNI), and Christians Association of Nigeria (CAN). These elderly
and religious leaders particularly those that have distinguished themselves or have wide knowledge
on religious matter, are given special status and informal power. As a result of this reason, their
homes become centres for social interactions, community meetings, prayer, as well as an avenue for
solving individual personal problems. As such the Emirate Council maintains a close relationship
with them as way of getting to the people during conflict situations. For example, through the active
collaborations of the Emirate Council and these ethno-religious leaders, the state was able to
prevent any violent attack on Christians in 2006 due to global reaction on re-publication of the
offensive Danish cartoons (Osaghae et al 1994; Gwarzo 2003; Larkin and Meyer 2006; Ehrhardt
2007).
CONCLUSION
The foregoing suggests that Kano Emirate Council, despite its lack of recognition by the Nigerian
constitution plays an important role in the management of ethnic and religious conflicts which has
bedeviled Kano state since its creation in 1967. In addition, it also reveals that there is preference
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for informal conflict management by the populace in Kano state. However, the success of the
Emirate Council is attributed to its pre-colonial administrative structures and the public trust. This
also shows that Kano state populace still has respect for the traditional institution. Therefore, the
Emirate Council should be encouraged and enhanced by the government to continue with the task of
managing ethno-religious conflicts in the state. One important way of encouraging the Emirate
Council is through according it the vital constitutional recognition. This is because apart from
giving it legal authority the constitutional recognition will entail more benefits to the Emirate
Council thereby encouraging it to perform more effectively. On the backdrop of the above findings,
this paper concludes that Kano state and by extension Nigeria at large can improve its domestic
security management which is often threatened by ethno-religious conflicts through reintegration of
traditional institutions like Kano Emirate Council into its security management framework.
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